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ANOTHER BLOW TO TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: A LOOK AT
CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN INDIAN TRIBES AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES
Andrew G. Hill*
I. Introduction
Perhaps the most basic principle ofall Indian law, supported by a
host of decisions, is that those powers lawfully vested in an Indian
nation are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express
acts of Congress, but rather "inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished. "'
The keystone of Indian tribes has long been their inherent sovereignty.
Much confusion, however, surrounds the rights and powers that accompany
the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Most laypersons today envision tribal
sovereignty as the doctrine that allows tribes to conduct gaming on tribal
lands, but do not consider the vast opportunities that Indian tribes have
retained through their classification as sovereign entities. Among the powers
that sovereigns possess are the right to tax, the right to establish courts and law
enforcement agencies, the right to enact legislation, and the right to govern
themselves independent of state and federal governments. Sovereign rights
were once essential to maintaining the tribes' existence before Europeans
colonized America, but the Supreme Court has since severely limited the
powers of Indian tribes.2 Despite reining in the powers and responsibilities
Indian tribes may exert, the Supreme Court has also been careful to ensure
Indian tribes retain their sovereign status.
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 206 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2005) (1941) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)).
2. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
3. See generally Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (holding tribes
immune from suits on contracts absent congressional abrogation).
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The doctrine of inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes was first articulated by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia.4 Throughout his time on
the Court, Chief Justice Marshall meticulously protected tribal sovereignty
while limiting only two essentials of tribal powers-the right to convey land
to anyone other than the federal governments and the right to deal with foreign
powers.' Famously, Chief Justice Marshall refused to recognize the Indian
tribes as "foreign nations."7 Rather, Marshall classified Indian tribes as
"domestic dependent nations."8 This categorization limited state intrusion into
the governance of Indian tribes and affirmed the tribes' inherent right to exist
as sovereign communities. Since Chief Justice Marshall's ruling on the status
of Indian tribes, however, the Court has set significant limitations on tribes'
inherent sovereignty. The Supreme Court has ruled that Indian tribes lack
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.' Furthermore, tribes have been held to
have no preemptive power to regulate liquor sales on reservations,"o and they
can no longer regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-
owned land within their reservations."
Despite the erosion of tribal sovereignty, the authority of tribes to enact
criminal laws "follows from their status as sovereign political entities."l2 This
authority includes "the power to administer justice through law enforcement
and judicial branches."" To this end, "[m]any tribes have created law
enforcement departments." 4 Generally, the principle set forth in Worcester
remains intact: "[S]tate law does not apply to Indian affairs in Indian Country
without congressional consent."" "[S]tate law" has included legislative
enactments, judicial decisions, and state or local executive authority." But
state law does apply in Indian Country to matters that do not affect Indians or
their property and in matters where Congress has clearly indicated the
4. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
6. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
7. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831).
8. Id. at 16.
9. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
10. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983).
11. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
12. CHARLES WILKINSON, AM. INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRMIES AS SOVEREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 34 (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc. 2004) (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 40.
16. WILKNSON, supra note 12, at 40.
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permissibility of state regulation. 7 In addition, "state law normally applies to
Indians outside of Indian Country." 8
The principles set forth in Worcester notwithstanding, the passage of Public
Law 280 by Congress in 1953 gave six states jurisdiction over most crimes
occurring on Indian lands within their borders. 9 Public Law 280, which has
come under high scrutiny by advocates of tribal sovereignty, hinders an
essential part of that sovereignty-that Indian tribes can establish and maintain
a fair court system to handle Indian matters independent of state or federal
jurisdiction. Other states were allowed to elect similar transfers of power by
their own initiative, 20 but Oklahoma is one state that declined to extend state
jurisdiction within Indian Country. Oklahoma's refusal to adopt Public Law
280, however, did not preclude it from entering voluntary cross-jurisdictional
law-enforcement agreements with Indian tribes.
Oklahoma's first cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreement between
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and an Oklahoma county took place on
February 14, 1992.21 The first agreement in Oklahoma between a city and a
tribe without the intervention of the BIA came a mere two months later, when
the City of Stroud entered a cross-deputization agreement with the Sac and
Fox Nation on April 8, 1992.22 As a result of an agreement between the State
of Oklahoma and the BIA in 2006, cities and counties today "only need to sign
simple addendums to cross-deputize tribal police."23 In mid-2007, records
within the office of the Oklahoma Secretary of State showed that thirteen
tribes, thirty-two counties, eighty cities, six district attorneys, three colleges,
and eight state agencies had or have held cross-deputization agreements.24
Initially, the purpose of cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements
was to help struggling Indian tribes with the costs associated with maintaining
a police force, as well as to help the efficiency and effectiveness of the tribal
police force. But the hopes ofjump-starting tribal police forces had the actual
17. See id. at 40-41.
18. Id. at 40.
19. Id. at 41.
20. Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
21. OKLA. INDIAN AFFAIRS COMM'N, COMPACTS, CONTRACTS & AGREEMENTS, http://www.
ok.gov/oiac/CompactsContracts, and-Agreements/index.html (last visited June 23, 2010).
22. Id.
23. Cross-Deputization Helps Solve Jurisdictional Issues in Oklahoma, NEWS FROM INDIAN
COUNTRY, May 28, 2007, available at http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option=com
content&task-view&id=603&Itemid=109.
24. Id.
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effect of impeding the development of self-governing Indian tribes. Problems
soon arose concerning what to do about questions of racism, economics, and
tort liability that might arise from state jurisdiction on Indian lands. What was
thought to be an agreement between local entities and tribal police forces to
help establish self-determination soon became a struggle for Indian tribes to
assert self-governance concerning law enforcement.
Part II of this comment discusses the racial problems that arise when state
governments are allowed to exercise jurisdiction within Indian lands. Tribal
lands remain the only jurisdictions within the geographic boundaries of the
United States that prosecute based on the distinction of race.25 Tribal courts
are allowed to hear cases involving Indians; they cannot, however, try cases
involving non-Indians despite the crime being committed on Indian land.26
Part III of this comment describes the confusion and uncertainty within the
court systems that accompany cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements--especially if tort actions arise in the process of law enforcement.
Part IV of this comment addresses the economic implications that arise when
states begin to infringe on the self-governance of tribal nations. Essentially,
small tribes located within or near large state municipalities will retain a
substantial benefit from the agreement of cross-jurisdictional law enforcement,
while large tribes will carry a highly increased burden when located around
small, rural state jurisdictions. This comment concludes with Part V, which
argues that cross-jurisdictional law enforcement does not help establish Indian
self-determination and, in fact, deals a significant blow to the inherent tribal
sovereignty of Indian nations.
It is becoming an increasingly alarming trend that tribes will blindly give
up their inherent sovereign power to enforce laws and administer justice in
hopes of progressing the concept of self-determination. Conversely, the theory
of self-determination is firmly rooted in the ideas of self-governance and
sovereignty that Indian tribes have increasingly given away in these cross-
jurisdictional agreements with state and local entities. This comment
concludes by reiterating the dangers and risks associated with allowing non-
Indians to have law-enforcement jurisdiction within tribal lands.
25. Greg Guedel, Why Are Tribal Courts the Last Race-Based Jurisdiction in the United
States?, NATIVE AM. LEGAL UPDATE, Dec. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nativelegal
update.com/2008/12/articles/why-are-tribal-courts-the-last-racebased-jurisdiction-in-the-united-
states/.
26. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
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H. Race-Based Arrests and Prosecutions Within Indian Country Raise
Constitutional Issues and Cause Law-Enforcement Confusion
Our legislators here have much faith in law for white men; I wish
it were possible to persuade them that it is equally beneficial to
Indians.27
Within the United States, "American Indians . .. have disproportionately
high rates of arrest and incarceration, and possibly longer prison terms than
whites due to discretionary actions by criminal justice decision-makers." 28 In
fact, studies show that the rate of arrests of American Indians for all crimes is
about twenty-five percent higher than for whites,29 and the arrest rate for
American Indians for driving while intoxicated is thirty- to forty-percent
higher than for whites.o Although other factors or reasoning might exist, it is
probable that discrimination is being practiced toward American Indians by
predominately non-Indian police officers. This tendency does not necessarily
indicate discrimination at only one stage of the criminal-justice process such
as arrest, prosecution, or sentencing, but could instead indicate a "cumulative"
effect of discrimination by law-enforcement personnel." Despite any
justifications for this trend, the fact that it exists at all should raise red flags
before allowing local non-Indian police officers to assert criminal jurisdiction
over Indians within Indian Country.
A. Confusion Regarding Race ofa Criminal Suspect During Pursuit, Arrest,
and Detention
Agreements between Indian tribes and state or local governments are
recognized as a worthy objective by political leaders from both sides for the
purpose of addressing the practical needs and difficulties of running or
maintaining a government. Nevertheless, race-based discrimination has
27. WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCULTURATION
AND CONTROL 105 (Univ. ofNeb. Press 1980) (1966) (quoting Indian Service member William
Nicholson, 1876).
28. Zoann K. Snyder-Joy, Self-Determination andAmerican Indian Justice: Tribal Versus
Federal Jurisdiction on Indian Lands, in NATIVE AMERICANS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 38, 44
(Marianne 0. Nielsen & Robert A. Silverman eds., 1996).
29. Robert A. Silverman, Patterns of Native American Crime, in NATIVE AMERICANS,
CRIME, AND JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 58, 66.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Snyder-Joy, supra note 28, at 44.
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proven an inevitable barrier to implementing cross-deputization of law-
enforcement officers between Indian tribes and local governments. The
Constitution of the United States assures that race will not be an issue during
lawful arrests.32 But this is not the case on tribal lands, where race is a factor
taken into account when making arrests.
In Duro v. Reina the Supreme Court held that, as domestic dependent
sovereigns, tribes have no power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians
who are not members of their own tribe.34 Congress, however, recognized the
severe limitations this ruling put on Indian tribes' sovereignty and swiftly
superseded the ruling in Duro, affirming "the inherent power of Indian tribes
. . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."3  This decision by
Congress ensured that tribes' jurisdictional powers over other Indians remain
extensive, furthering the notion that Indian Country remains the only
jurisdiction within the geographic boundaries of the United States that still
determines prosecutorial decisions based on whether the accused is an Indian."
The Court ruled in Oliphant that tribal courts are forbidden to assert
jurisdiction over non-Indian criminal defendants. While this characteristic
of tribal jurisdiction is essential to keeping non-Indians from being haled into
tribal courts and having to face a foreign court process, it necessarily
circumscribes an important piece of the tribes' inherent sovereignty by limiting
tribal governance. Moreover, to allow local officials to exert jurisdiction over
Indians on tribal land, make arrests on tribal land, and expose Indians to state-
court systems further reduces the importance not only of tribal police officers,
but of tribal courts as well.
Opportunities for cross-deputized police officers from neighboring
communities to discriminate during the pursuit, arrest, or detention of suspects
will not only be possible, but likely, as officers struggle with confusing
jurisdictional requirements that arise from race-based decisions. The first law-
enforcement officer responding to a crime will initiate an investigation and
may detain a suspect." The law-enforcement officer will then be required to
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. E.g., Greg Guedel, Blackfeet Nation Enters into Cross-Border Law Enforcement Pact,
NATIVE Am. LEGAL UPDATE, Aug. 7, 2009, available at http://www.nativelegalupdate.
com/2009/08/articles/blackfeet-nation-enters-into-crossborder-law-enforcement-pact/.
34. 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
35. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
36. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
37. Id.
38. ANDREA WILKINS ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: REDUCING CRIME
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make a decision as to whether the suspect's actions should be handled by tribal
or non-Indian law enforcement.39 Subsequently, these officers must determine
where to refer the criminal suspect-the United States attorney's office, the
local district attorney, or the tribal court.40 This decision of the law-
enforcement officer is not only confusing, but also could have far-reaching
implications for the severity of punishment received by the criminal suspect.
Tribal courts have restricted criminal jurisdiction and may hear only cases
involving Native Americans accused of misdemeanors or crimes not listed in
the Major Crimes Act.4 1 The cases that do go before tribal courts, however, are
often handled very differently from those before state or federal courts, and the
punishments are often viewed by mainstream culture as minor or insignificant
when compared to the crime. This is because tribal communities and courts
alike often take a cue from the traditional peacemaking theory of
jurisprudence, which Indians have historically employed.42
For instance, a tribal member convicted of drunk driving might not receive
a fine in tribal court but instead may be "ordered to cut firewood for an elderly
community member."4 3 Likewise, hunting violators brought before a tribal
court may be ordered to provide meat for tribal members attending
celebrations or wakes." Because state and local authorities could have
difficulty accepting the fate of a criminal suspect if taken to tribal court,
officers might be more inclined to refer the Indian suspect to state or federal
court for fear of a suspected criminal not receiving an "appropriate"
punishment from tribal courts.
THROUGH STATE-TRIBAL COOPERATION 8 (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/
statetribe/CJIC_08.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153 (2006) (granting jurisdiction to the federal
government over the following crimes: murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to commit
murder, kidnapping, rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with
a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and
larceny); see EILEEN LUNA-FIREBAUGH, TRIBAL POLICING: ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY, SEEKING
JUSTICE 27 (2007).
42. Joan Abrams, Who's The Law of The Land?, in NATIVE AMERICANS, CRIME, AND
JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 148, 148.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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B. Open Hostilities Between Indian Tribes and Rural Communities Cause
Prejudicial Bias in the Application of Police Force
Indians and their non-Indian neighbors have not historically been
allies, and the rift between Indian and rural communities runs deep
and is not easily overcome by pointing out their common
characteristics and experiences. . . . At the very best, Indian and
rural relationships may still be marked by a feeling of
separateness; at the very worst, open hostility remains.45
Crime is an increasing problem in Indian Country. "The overall occurrence
of violent crime, including domestic violence, is disproportionately high in
Indian Country." 6 In fact, American Indians are more than twice as likely to
become victims of violent crime as will the general United States population.4 7
These facts make it crucial that Indians "feel comfortable and safe in
contacting their police and in reporting criminal victimization."48 This is not
always the case:
Despite these starting numbers, studies show crime is
underreported in Indian Country. The research credits the failure
to report crime to a distrust of the police, shame and humiliation
associated with certain kinds of crime and fear of retaliation....
Often tribal members are reluctant to report crime as complicated
family and clan relationships between victims, offenders and even
trial police officers discourage it. Also, tribal members may be
reluctant to report another Indian to a state or federal agency, which
could bring the weight of a foreign system down on the
perpetrator.4 9
A report conducted in 2004 by the United States Department of Justice
"found that American Indians are twice as likely as other races to be victims
of violence."o While whites and blacks primarily tend to be victims of
45. Joanna M. Wagner, Special Feature, Improving Native American Access to Federal
Funding for Economic Development Through Partnerships with Rural Communities, 32 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 525, 551 (2007-2008).
46. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 38, at 3.
47. Id.
48. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 92.
49. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 38, at 3.
50. Richard Roesler, Bill Aims to Expand Tribal Cops'Authority, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-
REV., Feb. 27, 2008, at Al.
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violence by someone of their own race, the Department of Justice study
indicates "that Indians are primarily victimized by members of other races.""
Robberies and assaults of tribal members are committed by whites or blacks
at least two-thirds of the time, and even more appalling are the numbers for
sexual assault revealed by the study.52 Federal statisticians reported that of all
Indians raped or sexually assaulted, eighty-six percent of the attacks were
committed by whites or blacks.
Although statistics reveal that Indians are far more susceptible to violent
crimes,54 apprehension still exists among many Indians about reporting crimes
to any law-enforcement officer who is not a part of the tribal police force.
This further emphasizes the need of the tribal community to keep a police
force that is viewed as separate and distinct from the non-Indian police force
in order to increase the reporting of crimes. If tribal police forces continue to
enter agreements with non-Indian police departments, the fears of tribal
members to report crimes may increase, and crime rates against Indians will
continue to go unreported, potentially resulting in a drastic rise in the amount
of violent crimes committed against tribal members.
Along with racial prejudice, myriad social implications within Indian
Country must be taken into account when considering the effects of cross-
jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements. Native Americans are consistently
viewed as "one of the poorest minority groups in the nation."5 6 "Issues
associated with poverty on tribal lands and substandard health conditions--
including a life expectancy rate far below the national average, all contribute
to increased criminal activity and high victimization rates within Native
communities."" Poor educational systems, high unemployment rates, rampant
drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, sexual assault, mental illness, and
high suicide rates all contribute to a complex and often troubling social portrait
for Indian tribes that underscores the need for some type of diversity training
of local police officers in order successfully to implement cross-jurisdictional
law-enforcement agreements."
While both tribal and non-Indian police officers are faced with the
challenges of "fulfilling [their responsibilities] to provide for . . . effective,
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 38, at 3.
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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efficient and safe operation[s]," tribes alone are left to "protect[] tribal culture,
tradition and membership." 9 Additionally, "[w]hile Americanization and
modernization [have] caused extensive and massive changes in tribal justice
and law and order systems, many Indian nations still hold true to their
fundamental beliefs to create and live by holistic philosophies."o It is likely
that problems will erupt and discrimination lawsuits may arise because non-
Indian law-enforcement officials are either unaware of or in disagreement as
to the fundamental beliefs of certain Indian tribes.
To safeguard against these potential problems, the rural communities
currently entering these cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements will
need to incorporate multicultural training and diversity awareness into their
current training programs in order to ensure that racial discrimination is
reduced. Since the 1960s, law-enforcement officers have engaged in some
type of "cultural 'awareness' or 'sensitivity' training" to calm "hostile
relationships between police and 'racialized' communities" such as Indian
tribes. Unfortunately, these training efforts often create additional problems
as officers, asked to reflect on their own beliefs or stereotypes, sometimes feel
that they are being attacked on a personal level for "who they are and how they
think."62 As one training instructor observed, "Because we're talking about
people's values, we're talking about what makes them a person, and we're
asking people to look at themselves, reflect on themselves.... It's quite an
uncomfortable process for these people. When something's uncomfortable for
you, then it's a natural reaction sometimes to be hostile."'
Another limitation of multicultural training is that non-Indian officers often
are merely "looking for guidance on how to manipulate" their techniques in
order to comply with anti-discrimination rules." This distorts the objective of
multicultural training-from "enhanc[ing] police-community relations" to the
59. Ada Pecos Melton et al., Integrated Justice Systems in American Indian Communities
Planning Series: Understanding the Tribal Justice and Law Enforcement Environment, AM.
INDIAN DEV. Assoc. Q., Summer 2004, at 1, 8, available at http://www.aidainc.net/CRD%20
Envir.pdf.
60. Id. at 2.
61. BARBARA PERRY, POLICING RACE AND PLACE IN INDIAN COUNTRY: OVER- AND
UNDERENFORCEMENT 91 (2009).
62. Id. at 92.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 93 ("One officer specifically asked how he could stop a vehicle driven or
occupied by black people, which for him was 'suspicious' in his territory.").
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opposite purpose of "mask[ing] the racism" that some police employ during
their daily routines.65
Even with the implementation of multicultural-training and diversity-
awareness programs, it will be difficult to erase the cultural differences
between Indians and non-Indians. The implementation of cross-jurisdictional
law-enforcement agreements will ultimately lead to discriminatory arrests and
only further perpetuate the long-standing animosity between Indian tribes and
many rural communities.
C. Underpolicing and Overpolicing in Indian Country
Many Native Americans who have seen the rise of non-Indian law
enforcement in Indian Country feel that they are being underserved and
underprotected because of their race." Studies indicate that virtually all
communities comprised of racial minorities "are subject to law enforcement's
tendency to underpolice-and thus under-protect-their communities."
Furthermore, there appears to be a trend for federal officials to avoid their duty
to investigate and prosecute crimes in Indian Country." This could be due in
part to non-Indian law-enforcement officers' perspectives that Indians are
more "deserving" of crime because of the fact that crime rates on tribal lands
are so high.69 This reluctance of non-Indian law-enforcement officials to
recognize Indians as victims sidesteps the culpability of the offender by
blaming the Indian victims for their own harm.o Another common form of
belief among non-Indian police forces is the notion that Indians "overplay the
race card" for political reasons and therefore "bring[] stereotypes upon
themselves."n Whatever the reasoning, it is a "truism" in society and among
law-enforcement officers that, more often than not, Native Americans are
somehow more "deserving" of crime than non-Indians.72
It seems logical that entering into cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements with non-Indian police forces would provide more resources,
funding, and overall police presence in Indian Country. But in reality, the fact
of local police forces' failure adequately to protect Indian Country would only
65. Id.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 62.
70. Id. at 62-63.
71. Id. at 63.
72. Id. at 62.
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be exacerbated by the enactment of such agreements. These agreements,
which seemingly would help understaffed and underfunded tribal police
forces, would in actuality merely add a false sense of security for Indians as
they began to rely more on non-Indian law-enforcement officials who have
already demonstrated they are apprehensive about patrolling, protecting, and
serving Indian communities. Moreover, the distrust that Indians have for non-
Indian police forces could lead to increased crime rates, as underreporting of
crimes on tribal lands would swell.
Underpolicing in Indian Country does more than affect the immediate safety
of Indians. The "failure of law enforcement to intervene in [criminal] events"
causes Native Americans to believe that non-Indian police officials view
Indian victims' lives to be of less worth than others' lives. This has a
profound effect not only on perpetrators of crimes against Indians, but on
future perpetrators of crimes against Indians who would see "no serious
repercussions" for committing such crimes.74
The irony of non-Indian police surveillance in Indian Country is that the
disproportionately high monitoring "does not necessarily result in heightened
protection," as local police officers often patrol Indian Country for the purpose
of pursuing Native American offenders rather than protecting Native American
victims." Indians "have reason to believe that they are singled out . . .
simultaneously for both undue attention and inattention" by non-Indian police
officers.
The harsh realities of life in Indian country-higher criminality, alcohol
abuse, and violence-cause non-Indian police officers to view Indian Country
as "troublesome," thereby furthering the stereotypical belief of the deviance
of Indians in order to justify the non-Indian police forces' overpolicing of
Indian lands. Ultimately, discriminatory policing by non-Indian police officers
could cause confused identities of victims and suspects in the eyes of the
police officers based solely on which participant is an Indian. This view of
Indians is inherently problematic, especially when entering cross-jurisdictional
law-enforcement agreements, because Indians are often stereotypically viewed
by non-Indians as alcoholics who cannot be trusted and are prone to criminal
73. Id. at 71.
74. Id. at 65.
75. Id. at 61.
76. Id. at 47.
77. See Robynne Neugebauer, First Nations People and Law Enforcement: Community
Perspectives on Police Response, in INTERROGATING SOCIAL JUSTICE: POLITICS, CULTURE AND
IDENTITY 247, 256 (Marilyn Corisanos & Kelly Amanda Train eds., 1999).
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activity." This stereotype-driven focus also creates a cycle of self-fulfilling
prophecy in which the undue attention paid to Indians leads to higher crime
rates in Indian Country." These elevated crime rates will then draw more
attention to Indian Country as an area more prone to crime, which will "again
lead to inflated rates of detection and arrest" of Indians.o
Boundaries, specifically the boundaries between Indian Country and local
communities, "symbolically ... determine and reinforce ethnic separation and
segregation."" Consequently, these boundaries become important in
reinforcing the historical racial profiling of Indians by law-enforcement
officials.82 Indians have stated that they feel they have been singled out,
targeted, and stopped for searches merely because of their dark skin, dark hair,
and Indian ethnicity." The experience of one Indian in Montana is typical:
I've seen [police] just sit there by that bridge-that's the
border-and they'll sit here all day and just keep stopping us when
we have tribal plates. It's like, as soon as we leave the res, we're
stopped for any or no reason. It makes you not wanna leave, you
know ... ?"
With this type of documented racial profiling, it is not incomprehensible to
think that, by extending jurisdiction of non-Indian police into Indian Country,
Indians will be targeted and singled out by police officers acting on their own
personal beliefs that Indians are the source of criminal activity within their
own land.
This discriminatory behavior adds to Indians' feelings that they cannot trust
non-Indian police officers and furthers the problem of underreporting crimes
in Indian Country. Many Indians do not see police officers as helping the
problem of crime within Indian Country and thus view police as more of a
problem than a solution. Even victims of violence in Indian Country are often
viewed the same stereotypical way." Indeed, these stereotypes sometimes
serve as an excuse for racial violence," creating a situation in which cross-
jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements fail to reduce criminal activity in
78. See PERRY, supra note 61, at 49.
79. Id. at 54.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 53.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 51.
84. Id. at 53-54.
85. Id. at 51.
86. Id.
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Indian Country and actually cause an increase in underreporting of crimes
within tribal lands.
D. The Reluctance Associated with Information Sharing and the Problems
That Accompany Uninformed Law Enforcement
The interlocking relationships between tribal, state, and local governments
can be remarkably complex." Because of the complexities involved, a system
must be implemented that allows for the apprehension, adjudication, and
incarceration of criminals regardless of their Indian or non-Indian ethnicity.
Cross-jurisdictional communication is vital for state-tribal law-enforcement
agreements to succeed." Unfortunately, information sharing between tribes
and local entities is rarely done for many reasons.89 First, many tribes simply
do not have the computer capacity to share information with non-Indian
jurisdictions in the form of data collection and reporting.o Second, many
tribes "do not want to enter crime data on tribal members into an external data
base where their control of the data may be lost."'
Another reason is that many tribal members feel that the tribe has a
"responsibility to protect its members from any negative [criminal]
consequence[s]," and sharing information such as DWI/DUI records may
result in enhanced penalties to repeat offenders in state courts. 92  This
reasoning can be especially troubling to non-Indians, who might view this
logic as a means of concealing vital information about Indian offenders in
hopes of circumventing the alleged suspect's appropriate punishment.
Complicating matters further, many tribes do not participate in data research,
leaving the BIA unable to collect accurate crime statistics on reservations due
to sparse or unreliable information. 93
Information sharing serves a vital purpose to tribal and non-Indian officers
alike. Officers can be put in compromising situations and their safety can be
at risk if the first-responding officer is without access to criminal histories of
all participants in the incident, including the criminal histories of non-Indians
87. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 48.
88. WILKINS ET AL., supra note 38, at 29.
89. Id.
90. Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Ariz., Address at the Sovereignty
Symposium: Criminal Justice Issues in Indian Country (May 31, 2007), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/documents/statetribe/CJlssuesLuna.pdf
91. Id.
92. Melton et al., supra note 59, at 9.
93. See WILKINS ET AL., supra note 38, at 29.
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and Indians from other tribes.94 Scenarios such as where an Indian tribe has
jurisdiction over a domestic dispute, but a potential offender flees to state
jurisdiction, is another instance where cross-jurisdictional information sharing
is essential to determining the status of tribally issued protective orders or
warrants.95
Data integration between tribes and local jurisdictions would create a more
efficient and effective way to ensure uniformity and justice in cross-
jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements. Today, very few tribal justice-
integration efforts and even fewer justice-integration systems exist in which
tribes can share data with local non-Indian entities and other tribes.96 Without
a willingness to share information, police officers are put in dangerous
situations, and cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements will not create
the necessary benefits that would justify their enactment.
III. Perplexing Problems That Arise Within the Court System upon Arrest
A tribal court is broadly defined as:
a court administered through self-government of an American
Indian tribe, especially on a reservation and having federally
prescribed jurisdiction over custody and adoption cases involving
tribal children, criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed on
tribal lands by members of the tribe, and broader civil jurisdiction
over claims between tribe members and nonmembers."
Many tribal court systems have borrowed extensively from American court
systems, but many have also developed their own elaborate rules of procedure
and evidence." Indian tribal courts often look to informal methods of dispute
resolution, relying on tribal traditions to administer justice as a viable way of
asserting their inherent sovereignty while reinforcing and practicing their
distinct cultural values." Along with the confusion that currently exists in
determining which law-enforcement agency has the authority to act, state and
tribal courts further confound the jurisdictional nightmare through
inconsistencies in the administration of justice between the court systems.
These inconsistencies that arise in the procedures of state and tribal courts are
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11.
97. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 503 (7th ed. 1996).
98. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 89.
99. Id.
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counterproductive to establishing uniformity among adjudication efforts,
preventing cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements from being
productive.
Just like the uncertainty as to which law-enforcement agency has the
appropriate authority to enforce laws, state and tribal courts are faced with
similar problems about the scope of their respective jurisdictions. These
complexities make successful collaboration through cross-jurisdictional law-
enforcement agreements extremely difficult.'oo As with sharing a crime
database between tribal and non-Indian law-enforcement officers, it is equally
important that tribal courts and state courts share information "so that
judgments or orders issued in one jurisdiction are known and enforced by
neighboring jurisdictions."' 0 '
A. Tribal Courts Lose Their Purpose and Necessity
Tribal policing, an important assertion of tribal sovereignty, lies at the heart
of the tribal legal system.0 2 In theory, functioning tribal courts benefit
surrounding non-Indian communities.' 03 The existence of tribal courts helps
local communities by "alleviat[ing] some of the case load on municipal and
county courts."'" Tribal courts also "enable tribes to better regulate and
control potentially harmful activities on Indian land."' 5 Crucially, education
of local communities about the overall benefits of tribal courts and tribal
courts' limitations keeps these communities from turning on "tribal court[s]
when the interest of a non-Indian are . . . adversely affected."o' Without
education, communities and state courts misunderstand "tribal court
procedures and are cautious when confronted with tribal court orders because
they believe that tribal court systems do not comply with the same standards
as state courts." 0 7
Tribal courts often impose very different punishments from those of state
and federal courts.' Tribal courts tend to be more informal, serving as
100. WILKINS ETAL., supra note 38, at 9.
101. Id.
102. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 130.
103. CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND
PUBLIC LAw 280, at 209 (1997).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. B.J. Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the Justice System 13 (Mar. 2000)
(unpublished monograph), available at http://www.icctc.org/Tribal%20Courts-final.pdf.
108. See Abrams, supra note 42, at 148-49.
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forums for arbitration, conciliation, and restoring social harmony rather than
for punishment'"-"[s]ometimes the penalt[ies] may not satisfy the judges in
the state court, but they are tailored to get better results on the reservation."" 0
Whether the decisions of tribal judges in fact tend to create better results on
the reservation, local police officers often prove unwilling to accept the
possibility that suspects will face "lesser" punishments from tribal courts. As
a result, and in part because of cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements, non-Indian police officers who arrest Indians on tribal land will
often choose to refer the suspect to state court rather than tribal court in the
belief that the suspect will be punished more severely there than in tribal
court.'" This creates a problem for tribal and state courts alike. Tribal courts,
long a symbol of sovereignty and self-governance within Indian Country, may
have lesser significance and a continually decreasing role as state courts'
dockets continue to fill up with Indians arrested by non-Indian police officers.
This will further burden the state court system with offenses that could easily
(and properly) be adjudicated in tribal courts.
B. Inevitable Tort Actions During Police Enforcement Create Uncertainty
One significant problem raised by many who oppose cross-jurisdictional
law-enforcement agreements is the likelihood of tort actions that arise if an
officer acts inappropriately and the question of where liability for that conduct
will rest. For example, of the thirty-nine county sheriffs in the state of
Washington, thirty-eight of them oppose a bill that would expand tribal police
officers' power to arrest non-Indian criminal suspects on reservations.12 The
sheriffs oppose the proposed law because they are worried about their liability
in the event of a lawsuit concerning a tribal officer's actions."' The common
belief of these sheriffs is that allowing tribal police to arrest non-Indian
suspects will cause higher rates of inappropriate police action due to lack of
training in the tribal police force." 4 Tribally funded agencies are typically
plagued by a wide array of barriers that make it difficult to train their police
officers properly."' Tribal members have stated, however, that they believe
109. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 29.
110. Abrams, supra note 42, at 149.
111. Id.
112. Roesler, supra note 50.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. PERRY, supra note 61, at 101.
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non-Indians' theories that tribal officers have insufficient training compared
with that of non-Indian officers is "presumptuous" and "inaccurate."' 16
Some state legislation tends to comport with the sheriffs' assumptions about
the lack of tribal training. Washington state law requires that persons hired as
police officers have six months from the beginning of employment to
commence basic law-enforcement training, and there is no exception to this
requirement for commissioned tribal officers."' In 2006, the Washington State
Legislature adopted legislation requiring tribal officers to become certified as
peace officers before enforcing state and local criminal laws."'8 Yet it is
difficult for tribes to allow their officers, who are often a part of a very minute
tribal police force, to go off-duty long enough to attend state or federal
certification programs."' Furthermore, the few officers who do attend
certification courses rarely finish the certification process,'20 a fact largely due
to the distance from home of the training sessions and the failure of programs
to meet the officer's specific training needs.' 2 ' Instead, tribal officers are often
put through more culturally specific training by their tribal governments.122
Much of this culturally specific training would also greatly benefit non-Indian
law-enforcement personnel-if cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements have any chance of significantly improving law enforcement in
Indian Country.
Many cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements already in effect
allow a local sheriffs department to have authority over tribal officers
whenever those officers are in that department's county, even when the tribal
officers are on tribal lands.123 This underscores the notion that Indians have
historically and continuously "been constrained and disempowered" by the
policing trends within Indian Country, ultimately facilitating the
"criminalization and victimization" of Indians as a whole.124 Furthermore, this
type of agreement harms tribal sovereignty by relegating Indian police to a
submissive role with non-Indian law-enforcement officials, taking away from
116. Roesler, supra note 50 (quoting Scott Smith, chief of Tulalip tribal police).
117. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.101.200(1) (2009).
118. Id. § 43.101.157.
119. PERRY, supra note 61, at 101.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Tim Barnum, Still No Deal Worked Out Between Sheriffs Office, Tribal Police,
ARENAC COUNTY INDEP. (Standish, Mich.), July 16, 2009, available at http://www.arenac
independent.com/detail/81430.html (describing a past Arenac County, Mich. agreement).
124. PERRY, supra note 61, at 104.
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their authority and independence. The requirement that tribal police officers
go through the same training as non-Indian police officers not only challenges
the concept of self-determination for Indians, but also lessens the powers of
the tribal police force by essentially adding another officer to a local police
force rather than to the tribal police force.
This view of tribal law-enforcement training starts tribal police officers on
an unequal footing from the very beginning of cross-jurisdictional law-
enforcement agreements and likewise creates a view of tribal police officers
as "inferior." This could be seen by some as a minor price to pay for enhanced
police enforcement on tribal lands, but the commonly held belief that tribal
police officers are undertrained could cast significant doubt on the
appropriateness of the actions of tribal police officers in case a tort lawsuit
ensues from an arrest. Allowing tribal police to be the first responders to
crime scenes and also to make arrests of non-Indians may open a floodgate of
complicated and complex litigation. For example, if both a tribal police officer
and a non-Indian police officer respond to a call and as a result of police
misconduct a tort action ensues, discrimination and beliefs as to proper
training techniques could tip the scales of liability heavily toward the tribal
police officer.'25
To combat the overwhelming possibility that tribal police officers will be
subject to liability in the event of officer misconduct, some type of hold-
harmless clause must be implemented into cross-jurisdictional law-
enforcement agreements. A hold-harmless clause prevents either the tribal or
local police force from becoming a defendant in a lawsuit if an employee of
one department is "sued for allegations that the officer did something worthy
of a lawsuit while assisting on the scene with [the other police force] without
a formal request to assist."'26 A hold-harmless clause in cross-jurisdictional
law-enforcement agreements would help somewhat in the effective
adjudication of a lawsuit in the event that one arises; not all lawsuits, however,
will fall neatly into the protection of the clause. In order completely to
eliminate the potential burden of having liability being placed on a tribal
police department for misconduct by non-Indian police (or vice versa), the
police forces must stay entirely separate and distinct entities. This will avoid
confusion in the event of a lawsuit and cause liability to fall only on the police
department that is responsible for the inappropriate actions.
125. See id. at 97-102.
126. Barnum, supra note 123.
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IV Economic Implications of Cross-Jurisdictional Law-Enforcement
Agreements
Although some larger tribes are well-known for their economic self-
sufficiency, many Indian tribes are economically unstable. 12 7 This fact tends
to lend support to the notion of cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements, but one has to wonder about the burdens this extra workload will
place on non-Indian police forces and the impact the increased workload will
have on the effectiveness of local law enforcement. Smaller Indian tribes with
few police officers will essentially be seeking a free handout of law-
enforcement personnel without being able to compensate states or contribute
to the increased funding required to expand local law-enforcementjurisdiction.
Comparatively, large tribes with large law-enforcement budgets who are
located near smaller rural communities will be forced to increase their
workload to accommodate the extended jurisdictional boundaries created by
these cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements.
Tribal law enforcement is severely underfunded.'28 Tribes have a spending
level of approximately $83 in public-safety funds per resident, compared with
$104 per resident in non-Indian communities.'29 When viewed in light of the
potential cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements, one would think
that tribal policing per resident would increase as a result of the heightened
spending accompanying the non-Indian police forces' presence in Indian
Country. But realistically, as non-Indian police forces' spending per resident
decreases as a result of the additional tribal-land jurisdiction, policing in Indian
Country will also decrease as non-Indians have fewer dollars to spend on their
own residents. The decreased resources will then be spread more thinly and
the long-standing animosity, racism, and stereotypes against Native Americans
as prone to criminality will continue to hinder non-Indian police officers from
adequately policing Indian Country. Thus, the effect of these cross-
jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements would be only to further dilute the
public-safety funds per resident in non-Indian communities and cause non-
Indian police forces to work harder in order to maintain the same level of
policing in non-Indian communities as before the agreements. And all of this
will take place while non-Indian police forces continue to neglect Indian
communities.
127. See Wagner, supra note 45, at 533-34.
128. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 15.
129. STEWART WAKELING ET AL., POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 27 (2001).
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When funding restraints are coupled with raised expectations of higher
police presence in Indian communities, the disappointing result that likely
ensues will "be very demoralizing for a [tribal] government and a citizenry."3 o
For a more realistic way to raise policing in Indian Country, tribes should
seriously examine their own funding sources for tribal policing efforts. By
reapportioning monies to fund a police force that will be autonomous from
state and local police forces, tribes will further promote the concept of inherent
sovereignty.
The belief that cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements will
increase the funding of tribal police departments while maintaining autonomy
within tribal policing is na'ive at best. In the current economic climate, non-
Indian police agencies are already being understaffed, facing lower funding,
and requiring personnel cuts in order to meet their budgets."' Indeed, law-
enforcement departments throughout the United States face "budget
constraints, the need to recruit and train law enforcement officers, and a lack
of up-to-date technology."' 32 These problems are only intensified in the
specific context of the notoriously underfunded police departments of Indian
tribes. 3 By expanding the jurisdictional boundaries of already-overextended
non-Indian police departments, the problem will only increase as law-
enforcement personnel both from local and tribal police departments become
burdened with larger geographic and jurisdictional boundaries.
The rural nature of most tribal lands, coupled with the widely dispersed
populations within Indian Country, has caused state- and locally trained police
officers to struggle in the administration ofjustice.134 These officers are often
without cell-phone towers or landlines and have restricted car-radio service,
limited paved roads, and relatively few 911 emergency-response systems.' 5
While Indian police officers who routinely patrol tribal lands might be
accustomed to working without these tools, significant amounts of training
would be required to acquaint state and local police officers with the nuances
of patrolling tribal lands. Costs associated with this training would only
further burden the severely restrained budgets of police forces and are an
expense that would prove unnecessary if Indian police forces remained
autonomous.
130. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 16.
131. See Kevin Bohn, Police Face Cuts as Economy Falters, CNN, Oct. 23, 2008, http://
www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/23/police.economy/.
132. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 14.
133. Id. at 14-15.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Finally, tribes that choose to have autonomous tribal police forces will have
law-enforcement agencies that are accountable only to the tribes themselves,
rather than to state or local governments. Through responsible policing efforts
and accountability to their communities, these independent tribal police forces
continue to carry forward and promote Indian traditions of tribal sovereignty
and self-governance.
V Cross-Jurisdictional Law-Enforcement Agreements Significantly Impair
Tribal Self-Determination and Sovereignty
In many cases, statejurisdiction over matters tribal has become (or
continues to be) intrusive and disruptive upon tribal life. As
inherent sovereigns in constant interaction with the states and the
national government, the tribes must continually defend their right
to self-government."
Tribal policing in the United States represents a crucial link in the "realization
of Native sovereignty to the extent that it is a reflection of tribal rights to shape
and enforce their own laws."' 3 "A tribal police department, if nothing else,
serves as a declaration of sovereignty, of the intent of a tribal government to
protect and serve its own citizens, and to render justice in a manner
understandable to and supported by the community."' 38 A truly sovereign
justice system would be completely rooted in the values of the Indian
community it serves and not be bound by any broader political agenda.'39
Tribal policing is the heart of the tribal legal system.'40 Indian police
departments first developed out of the tradition of service to Indian
communities and a personal sense of responsibility of tribal members to
protect and serve their communities.' 4' Notably, tribal administrators and
citizens view the role of tribal police as essential to maintaining the self-
governance of Indians and believe that tribal police serve as the embodiment
of sovereignty and justice on a daily basis. 42 Most, if not all, Indians consider
136. Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath ofTeague: The Interaction ofState and
Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 178-79 (2001-2002).
137. PERRY, supra note 61, at 100.
138. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 8.
139. Douglas M. Skoog, Taking Control: Native Self-Government and Native Policing, in
NATIVE AMERICANS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 118, 128-29.
140. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 130.
141. Id. at 126.
142. Id. at 127.
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being viewed as a useful person the ultimate compliment, and the commitment
of tribal police to serve their tribes despite the disadvantages of high crime
rates, inadequate funding, low salaries, and lack of material resources such as
police cars, radios, or complex computer databases is something to be revered
in Indian culture.143
Tribal police have been described as having a bad reputation and as being
among the worst police forces in America because they are more "plagued by
nepotism, lack of training, high job turnover, and lower pay" than other police
forces.'" But that is the perception of state and local police forces-the very
police forces currently diminishing tribal sovereignty by entering into cross-
jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements in which they would gain control
of policing Indian Country. Continual pressure to assimilate into American
culture and give up tribal sovereignty downplays the tradition of honor that has
long been associated with serving in tribal law enforcement and further
reduces the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes.
Further underscoring the need for a tribal police force is the reality that
traditional local police forces are adversarial and therefore antithetical to the
traditional tribal view that police forces should be focused on conciliation and
conflict resolution.'45 "While some may argue that Native persons do commit
more offenses than others, this has no effect on Native people's perception that
they are singled out for the coercive attention of the police."l4 6 Indians have
an overall "uncharitable attitude toward [non-Indian police officers] and fault
the police for at least some proportion of their over-representation in the
criminal justice system."' 47 This view solidifies the belief among tribes that
an autonomous police force would be more sensitive to the needs of Indians
and serve tribes more effectively.'48 Cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements would not only cause distrust in police forces as traditional tribal
police officers are replaced by non-Indian police officers on tribal lands, but
would also significantly reduce the amount of self-governance and sovereignty
that Indians have an inherent right to possess.
Tribes would also lose their ability to police their lands in a manner
conducive to the traditions and history of Indian police departments' roles as
143. Id.
144. Sidney Harring, NativeAmerican Crime in the UnitedStates, in INDIANSANDCRMINAL
JUSTICE 93, 102 (Laurence French ed., 1982).
145. Skoog, supra note 139, at 121.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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peacekeepers and resolvers of conflict.'49 "Peace and harmony, the principal
goals to which traditional Aboriginal concepts ofjustice were geared, have not
been accommodated easily by an adversarial and adjudicative system."' 50
'Policing,' as the larger society uses the term, may be counterproductive" to
Native American culture and does not produce just solutions to the problems
with crime faced on tribal lands because Indian culture is not accustomed to
the adversarial stance of traditional non-Indian law enforcement.'
Cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements have also eroded the
prestige that once accompanied being a tribal law-enforcement official. Tribes
have difficulty finding and recruiting educated, experienced police officers,
and "the attrition rate for trained [officers] is very high, with people often
leaving for more highly paid positions in the non-Indian community."'5 2 This
does not come as a surprise-the sole appeal of joining a tribe's police force
has always been the prestige and honor that accompanies the job, not the salary
or working conditions. Indeed, some tribal members have even accepted jobs
with tribal police forces that cannot offer any cars, radios, or other traditional
police equipment.' By entering cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements, tribes dilute the honor that once accompanied a position on a
tribe's police force.
Furthermore, tribes seem all too willing to give up an innate piece of their
sovereignty by conceding their exclusive right to patrol, protect, and serve
Indian Country by the means of a tribal police department. Although the
desire still exists among Indian tribes to be truly sovereign and self-governing,
legal and administrative obstacles create difficulties in maintaining a strong
tribal police force that adequately represents the sovereign status of Indian
tribes. 154 Despite these obstacles, tribal governments must remain committed
to the idea that tribal law enforcement is an essential and successful assertion
of a tribe's inherent sovereignty.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting A.C. HAMILTON & C.M. SINCLAIR, THE JUSTICE SYTEM AND ABORIGINAL
PEOPLE: REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL JUSTICE INQUIRY OF MANITOBA (1991)).
151. Id.
152. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 41, at 128.
153. Edward C. Byrne, The Oneida TribalPolice: Politics andLaw Enforcement, in NATIVE
AMERICANS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 114, 115.
154. Skoog, supra note 139, at 127.
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VI. Conclusion
The inherent sovereignty that Chief Justice John Marshall expressed in
Worcester v. Georgia's is at risk from the continued acceptance of agreements
between Indian tribes and local communities. Although only the federal
government can limit the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes, many tribes are
freely offering to extinguish a piece of their sovereignty to local communities
in an effort to cut costs, increase efficiency, or ensure domestic tranquility for
their people.
The risks of cross-jurisdictional law enforcement are numerous. Indian
tribes and local communities have long held feelings of distrust toward one
another, causing racial implications to enter the decision-making process of
tribes entering these agreements with state and local police forces. A serious
look at the documented history of overpolicing and underpolicing of Indians
has also cast significant doubt on the effectiveness these agreements will have
on the desired outcome of making Indian Country safer. Confusion, complex
jurisdictional problems (not only during arrest, but within the court systems),
and misguided beliefs toward Indian culture all play a considerable part in
further complicating the issue of cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement
agreements. And finally, the cost of these agreements, coupled with the
decrease in effective and efficient patrolling, gives rise to a telling argument
that cross-jurisdictional law-enforcement agreements between tribal and non-
Indian police forces are counterproductive not only to tribal sovereignty, but
to the safety of Indians as well.
No shortcut or perceived increase in effectiveness is worth putting an entire
tribe's inherent sovereignty in jeopardy. Allowing states any sort of power or
control over a tribal jurisdiction's law enforcement is perilous and could prove
to be one more step in the direction away from sustaining tribal sovereignty.
155. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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